Conditionals and monotonic belief revisions: The success postulate

DOI10.1007/BF00370165MaRDI QIDQ2277446zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Horacio Arló-Costa

Publication date 1990

Published in Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00370165

zbMATH Keywords

belief revisionconditionalslogic of theory changeRamsey testsuccess postulate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other nonclassical logic (03B60) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27)

Review text

The author investigates the role played by the postulate of ``success in the AGM logic of theory change (i.e. the postulate that K*x is consistent whenever x is) in the generation of Gärdenfors' impossibility theorem (which says that certain of the AGM postulates are inconsistent, up to triviality, with the so-called Ramsey test). He argues that it is indeed the success postulate that should be regarded as responsible for the inconsistency, and that it continues to be so even when weakened in a way in which Gärdenfors at one point suggested. For this reason, he suggests, the postulate of ``success should be dropped from the logic of theory change.

Recommendations

• Belief-revision, the Ramsey test, monotonicity, and the so-called impossibility results
• The Ramsey test revisited*
• On the logic of iterated belief revision
• Iterated revision and minimal change of conditional beliefs
• Belief revision, epistemic conditionals and the Ramsey test

Cites work

• Knowledge in flux. Modeling the dynamics of epistemic states
• On the logic of theory change: Partial meet contraction and revision functions
• The Gärdenfors impossibility theorem in non-monotonic contexts

Cited in

(10)

• Partial monotonicity and a new version of the Ramsey test
• Two notions of epistemic validity. Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionals
• Two approaches to belief revision
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4150122 (Why is no real title available?)
• Belief-revision, the Ramsey test, monotonicity, and the so-called impossibility results
• Observations on validity and conditionals in belief revision systems
• Relevance Sensitive Non-Monotonic Inference on Belief Sequences
• Transmission failure, AGM style
• Monotonicity in Intuitionistic Minimal Change Semantics Given Gärdenfors’ Triviality Result
• The Gärdenfors impossibility theorem in non-monotonic contexts

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