Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction

DOI10.1007/s10670-016-9824-8zbMath1417.03059OpenAlexW2438566012WikidataQ59889477 ScholiaQ59889477MaRDI QIDQ1706798

Edward Elliott

Publication date: 28 March 2018

Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/102257/3/repository2.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05)

Related Items (1)

A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents

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