A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents

DOI10.1007/S10992-016-9408-8zbMATH Open1422.91247DBLPjournals/jphil/Elliott17OpenAlexW2514546801WikidataQ59886865 ScholiaQ59886865MaRDI QIDQ1685154FDOQ1685154

Edward Elliott

Publication date: 13 December 2017

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/103405/1/JPL%20Revision_FinalSubmission.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

utilitiesrepresentation theorempreferencescredencesirrational agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Utility theory (91B16)

Cites Work

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• Where does subjective expected utility fail descriptively?
• Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction
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• The value of truth: a reply to Howson

Cited In (1)

• Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief

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