A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents

DOI10.1007/S10992-016-9408-8MaRDI QIDQ1685154zbMATH OpenOpenAlexDBLPWikidataFDO

Authors Edward Elliott

Publication date 13 December 2017

Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/103405/1/JPL%20Revision_FinalSubmission.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

utilitiesrepresentation theorempreferencescredencesirrational agents

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5302870 (Why is no real title available?)
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Definition of Subjective Probability
• Conditional Expected Utility
• Decision making under uncertainty using imprecise probabilities
• Probabilism, representation theorems, and whether deliberation crowds out prediction
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Purely subjective maxmin expected utility
• Radical interpretation
• Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
• State-Dependent Utilities
• Subjective expected utility: A review of normative theories
• The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice
• The value of truth: a reply to Howson
• Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• Where does subjective expected utility fail descriptively?

Cited in

(1)

• Betting against the Zen monk: on preferences and partial belief

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