Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief

DOI10.1016/J.APAL.2013.06.015zbMATH Open1320.03048OpenAlexW2113255989MaRDI QIDQ490669FDOQ490669

Hannes Leitgeb

Publication date: 27 August 2015

Published in: Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2013.06.015

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zbMATH Keywords

belief revisiondoxastic logicsubjective probabilityformal epistemology

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Logic in artificial intelligence (68T27) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Cited In (24)

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Logical coherence in Bayesian simultaneous three-way hypothesis tests
• Aggregating credences into beliefs: threshold-based approaches
• Logics for belief as maximally plausible possibility
• Belief and probability: a general theory of probability cores
• PROBABILISTIC STABILITY, AGM REVISION OPERATORS AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY
• Ultralarge lotteries: analyzing the lottery paradox using non-standard analysis
• A normatively adequate credal reductivism
• Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence
• How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?
• Quantifying over events in probability logic: an introduction
• The representation of belief
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• A graded Bayesian coherence notion
• Introspection, Normality and Agglomeration
• Epistemic-state parallelism: translating between probabilities and ranks
• Bridging ranking theory and the stability theory of belief
• BELIEVING EPISTEMIC CONTRADICTIONS
• Credence as doxastic tendency
• Simple belief
• The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
• The Review Paradox: On The Diachronic Costs of Not Closing Rational Belief Under Conjunction
• Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence
• What should I believe about what would have been the case?

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