Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief
DOI10.1016/J.APAL.2013.06.015zbMATH Open1320.03048OpenAlexW2113255989MaRDI QIDQ490669FDOQ490669
Authors: Hannes Leitgeb 
Publication date: 27 August 2015
Published in: Annals of Pure and Applied Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apal.2013.06.015
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- Logical coherence in Bayesian simultaneous three-way hypothesis tests
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- Aggregating credences into beliefs: threshold-based approaches
- Logics for belief as maximally plausible possibility
- Belief and probability: a general theory of probability cores
- PROBABILISTIC STABILITY, AGM REVISION OPERATORS AND MAXIMUM ENTROPY
- Ultralarge lotteries: analyzing the lottery paradox using non-standard analysis
- A normatively adequate credal reductivism
- Context-sensitivity and the preface paradox for credence
- Belief as a simplification of probability, and what this entails
- The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief
- How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?
- Quantifying over events in probability logic: an introduction
- Believing epistemic contradictions
- Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief
- Impossibility results for rational belief
- What are degrees of belief?
- Introspection, normality and agglomeration
- Non-Additive Degrees of Belief
- The review paradox: on the diachronic costs of not closing rational belief under conjunction
- The representation of belief
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Belief and Degrees of Belief
- The stability theory of belief. A summary
- A graded Bayesian coherence notion
- Epistemic-state parallelism: translating between probabilities and ranks
- Bridging ranking theory and the stability theory of belief
- Credence as doxastic tendency
- Simple belief
- The joint aggregation of beliefs and degrees of belief
- Cognitivist probabilism
- From probabilities to categorical beliefs: going beyond toy models
- Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences
- Rigged lotteries: a diachronic problem for reducing belief to credence
- What should I believe about what would have been the case?
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