What should I believe about what would have been the case?

DOI10.1007/s10992-014-9314-xzbMath1318.03012OpenAlexW2095033023MaRDI QIDQ2018589

Franz Huber

Publication date: 24 March 2015

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/10836/1/JPL.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

counterfactualsconfirmationprobability measurescredencechanceranking functionsconditional belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Related Items

Why follow the royal rule?, New foundations for counterfactuals, COMPLETENESS FOR COUNTER-DOXA CONDITIONALS – USING RANKING SEMANTICS

Uses Software

• TETRAD

Cites Work

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