scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1014107

From MaRDI portal
Publication:4337968





It is a fact that there are few books devoted to a systematic and application-oriented approach to probability logic (PL). Two main reasons decided, the author to provide an elementary introduction to PL: (1) PL brings to human reasoning an important advance compared to modern non-probabilistic logic; (2) The traditional ``truth-conditional approach fails in application to conditionals because of the classical logic's radical separation of pure and practical logic, the way in which ``pure logic conclusions fail to influence the practical decision and action. The author takes into account some of the important theoretical fields that PL influenced directly: philosophical logic; decision theory applied within philosophy of science, philosphy of action, economics, various branches of psychology; linguistics and the philosphy of language; computer science and artificial intelligence, attempting to model the human reasoning processes by non-monotonic reasoning, which is so closed to conditional logic. The book contains nine chapters, nine appendices, answers to selected exercises, references etc. Chapter 2 (Probability and Logic) and Chapter 4 (Conditional Probabilities and Conditionalization) provide the gentle but necessary knowledge on the mathematical background of probability theory. Chapters 3 and 5 answer to the following question: given the probabilities of some premises, which is the probability of the corresponding conclusion based on a deductively valid inference? Chapter 3 (Deduction and Probability. I.) considers the ``static approach, not taking into account the fact that probabilities can change as a result of gaining information of adding new premises. Chapter 5 (Deduction and Probability. II.) introduces a ``dynamic dimension based on Bayes' principle and associated with the non-monotonicity of the inference process. Chapter 6 (Probability Conditionals) and Chapter 7 (Derivations in the Formal Theory of Probability Conditionals) focus on the logic of conditional propositions, relying on the following (controversial) assumption: the probabilities of conditional propositions are conditional probabilities. This kind of probabilities lead to a logic of conditionals radically different from the logic that is based on the assumption that the truth value of an ``if-then proposition is the same as that of a material conditional. Chapter 8 (Truth, Triviality, and Controversy) discusses the Alan Hajek's variant of David Lewis' fundamental Triviality Argument: in certain technical assumptions, if the ``right measure of a conditional's probability is a conditional probability then its probability cannot equal the probability of its being true, no matter how its truth might be defined. Chapter 9 (Practical Reason) gives a brief introduction to the theory of practical reason and shows how conclusions about propositions and their probabilities influence actions. This chapter ends with a philosophical discussion on the pragmatics of probability. Nine useful appendices are enclosed: A1 (Coherent Degrees of Confidence); A2 (Infinitesimal Probabilities and Popper Functions); A3 (David Lewis' Triviality Result); A4 (The Problem of Embedded Conditionals); A5 (`Statistical Reasonableness' of Contraposition); A6 (Counterfactual Conditionals); A7 (Probabilistic Predicate Logic); A8 (Probabilistic Identity Logic); A9 (Approximate Generalizations). The interest area for the readability of this book is prodigious: from philosophers to practitioners, from logicians to economists, and from mathematicians to linguists.




Cited in
(64)








This page was built for publication:

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4337968)