Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey's rule

DOI10.1007/S11229-018-1782-ZzbMATH Open1475.62081OpenAlexW2800036934WikidataQ129833428 ScholiaQ129833428MaRDI QIDQ2055907FDOQ2055907

Authors: John R. Welch

Publication date: 1 December 2021

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1782-z

Recommendations

Jeffrey-like rules of conditioning for the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence
Jeffrey's rule: an alternative procedure to model uncertainty
Getting fancy with probability
Jumping to conclusions. A logico-probabilistic foundation for defeasible rule-based arguments
Conditionalization and observation

zbMATH Keywords

Bayes' theorem probability plausibility pragma-dialectics Jeffrey's rule argumentation schemes argument evaluation informal logic deductive soundness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

Cites Work

Fuzzy sets and systems. Theory and applications
Fuzzy sets as a basis for a theory of possibility
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping
Towards a unified theory of imprecise probability
Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations
The logic of conditionals. An application of probability to deductive logic
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
A Definition of Subjective Probability
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Title not available (Why is that?)
Framing human inference by coherence based probability logic
Inference in conditional probability logic
A normative framework for argument quality: argumentation schemes with a Bayesian foundation
A Bayesian approach to informal argument fallacies
Great expectations. I: On the customizability of generalized expected utility
Great expectations. II: Generalized expected utility as a universal decision rule
Revising incomplete attitudes
Title not available (Why is that?)
Vague credence
Title not available (Why is that?)
A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency
Evaluating practical reasoning
Keynes after Ramsey: In defence of a treatise on probability
Title not available (Why is that?)

Cited In (1)

Imprecise probability and the measurement of Keynes's ``weight of arguments

This page was built for publication: Credence for conclusions: a brief for Jeffrey's rule

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2055907)