You've come a long way, Bayesians

DOI10.1007/s10992-015-9363-9zbMath1426.03020OpenAlexW1988765591MaRDI QIDQ266667

Jonathan Weisberg

Publication date: 13 April 2016

Published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-015-9363-9

zbMATH Keywords

decision theoryexpected utility theoryprobabilityknowledgeBayesianismjustificationimprecise probabilityepistemic utilityfoundationalismfull beliefindeterminate probabilityinfinitesimal probabilitiespartial beliefrepresentor theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)

Related Items (7)

Epistemology of causal inference in pharmacology, Towards a framework for the assessment of harms ⋮ On the modal logic of Jeffrey conditionalization ⋮ Probabilism, entropies and strictly proper scoring rules ⋮ GENERAL PROPERTIES OF BAYESIAN LEARNING AS STATISTICAL INFERENCE DETERMINED BY CONDITIONAL EXPECTATIONS ⋮ Having a look at the Bayes blind spot ⋮ Imprecise Probabilities and Unstable Betting Behaviour ⋮ On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Formal epistemology
• Subjective probabilities need not be sharp
• Finitely additive conditional probabilities, conglomerability and disintegrations
• The epistemic virtues of consistency
• Is conditioning really incompatible with holism?
• What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting
• Fair infinite lotteries
• Proper bootstrapping
• A Simple but Usually Fast Branch-and-Bound Algorithm for the Capacitated Facility Location Problem
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• How to Learn from Theory-Dependent Evidence; or Commutativity and Holism: A Solution for Conditionalizers
• Updating, Undermining, and Independence
• The Lottery Paradox Generalized?
• A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces
• FURTHER RESULTS ON THE INTRANSITIVITY OF EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT
• A New Solution to the Paradoxes of Rational Acceptability
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
• Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis
• Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief
• Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?
• Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief
• Generalizing the Lottery Paradox
• Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers
• How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?
• Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations

This page was built for publication: You've come a long way, Bayesians