What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting

DOI10.1007/s11238-009-9145-3zbMath1205.91064OpenAlexW2040232156MaRDI QIDQ2380524

Katie Steele

Publication date: 26 March 2010

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-009-9145-3

zbMATH Keywords

expected utility theorydynamic decision makingindependence axiomsequential choicediachronic Dutch book argumentordering axiom

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

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Cites Work

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