Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse preferences
DOI10.1007/S11229-006-9119-8zbMATH Open1130.03302OpenAlexW2046743615MaRDI QIDQ2460185FDOQ2460185
Authors: Katie Steele 
Publication date: 14 November 2007
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8
Recommendations
expected utilityrisk aversionimprecise probabilityEllsberg paradoxEllsberg decision modelindeterminate belief
Decision theory (91B06) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
Cites Work
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- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
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- The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
- Savage revisited (with discussion)
- Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making
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- A Rubinesque theory of decision
- Risk's place in decision rules
Cited In (10)
- Revising incomplete attitudes
- The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
- On the application of multiattribute utility theory to models of choice
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting
- IID: Independently and indistinguishably distributed.
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- On the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes
- Decision theory without ``independence or without ``ordering. What is the difference?
- Preference under risk in the presence of indistinguishable probabilities
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