Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse preferences

DOI10.1007/S11229-006-9119-8MaRDI QIDQ2460185zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Katie Steele

Publication date 14 November 2007

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityrisk aversionimprecise probabilityEllsberg paradoxEllsberg decision modelindeterminate belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1426635 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3288322 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3087284 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Rubinesque theory of decision
• Risk's place in decision rules
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• Savage revisited (with discussion)
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
• Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making

Cited in

(10)

• Revising incomplete attitudes
• The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
• On the application of multiattribute utility theory to models of choice
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5538083 (Why is no real title available?)
• What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting
• IID: Independently and indistinguishably distributed.
• Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
• On the Ellsberg and Machina paradoxes
• Decision theory without ``independence or without ``ordering. What is the difference?
• Preference under risk in the presence of indistinguishable probabilities

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