Distinguishing indeterminate belief from ``risk-averse preferences

DOI10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8zbMath1130.03302OpenAlexW2046743615MaRDI QIDQ2460185

Katie Steele

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-006-9119-8

zbMATH Keywords

expected utilityrisk aversionimprecise probabilityEllsberg paradoxEllsberg decision modelindeterminate belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)

Related Items (2)

What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting ⋮ Revising incomplete attitudes

Cites Work

• Unreliable probabilities, risk taking, and decision making
• Savage revisited (with discussion)
• Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
• Risk's place in decision rules
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