The Ellsberg Paradox and Risk Aversion: An Anticipated Utility Approach
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Publication:3809539
DOI10.2307/2526866zbMath0659.90010WikidataQ57256703 ScholiaQ57256703MaRDI QIDQ3809539
Publication date: 1987
Published in: International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp362.pdf
91B16: Utility theory
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