A theory of quantifiable beliefs
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Publication:1764790
DOI10.1016/S0304-4068(03)00042-9zbMath1101.91321MaRDI QIDQ1764790
Publication date: 22 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Non-expected utilityProbabilistic sophisticationSubjective probabilityQuantifiable beliefsState-dependent preferences
Related Items
Foundations of Bayesian theory ⋮ A theoretical foundation of ambiguity measurement ⋮ Do bets reveal beliefs? A unified perspective on state-dependent utility issues ⋮ Comparative Risk Aversion for State-Dependent Preferences ⋮ Expected utility with uncertain probabilities theory ⋮ On the equivalence of preferences ⋮ Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity
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