Decision making with imprecise probabilistic information
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Publication:707383
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.06.004zbMath1106.91022OpenAlexW2141195093MaRDI QIDQ707383
Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Christophe Vergnaud, Jean-Marc Tallon
Publication date: 9 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00086021/file/Gajdos-Tallon-Vergnaud-revised.pdf
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- Rational Behavior under Complete Ignorance
- Integral Representation Without Additivity
- A Definition of Uncertainty Aversion
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