Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:649975
DOI10.1007/S11238-010-9197-4zbMATH Open1274.91135OpenAlexW1975771941MaRDI QIDQ649975FDOQ649975
Authors: Raphaël Giraud, Jean-Marc Tallon 
Publication date: 25 November 2011
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00502781/file/GT_V4.pdf
Recommendations
Cites Work
- On the consistency of Bayes estimates
- Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior
- Risk, ambiguity and the Savage axioms
- Differentiating ambiguity and ambiguity attitude
- Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study
- Estimating ambiguity aversion in a portfolio choice experiment
- Imprecise probabilistic beliefs as a context for decision-making under ambiguity
- Objective and subjective rationality in a multiple prior model
- Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
- Attitude toward imprecise information
- Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries1
- Ambiguity Without a State Space
- On the generic nonconvergence of Bayesian actions and beliefs
- Decision making with imprecise probabilistic information
- Axioms for preferences revealing subjective uncertainty and uncertainty aversion
- Decision making over necessity measures through the Choquet integral criterion
Cited In (7)
This page was built for publication: Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q649975)
