The objectivity of subjective Bayesianism

DOI10.1007/S13194-018-0200-1MaRDI QIDQ2289709zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yanyan Li

Publication date 24 January 2020

Published in European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13199/

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zbMATH Keywords

statistical inferenceBayesianismobjectivityfrequentismHeather Douglasvalue-free ideal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Recommendations

• In defence of objective Bayesianism
• Does it make sense to be an ``objective Bayesian? (Comment on articles by Berger and by Goldstein)
• Subjective Bayesian analysis: principles and practice
• Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?
• Subjectivity and objectivity in Bayesian statistics: rejoinder to the discussion

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• Probability Theory
• Robust Statistics
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• Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?

Cited in

(12)

• The subjectivity of scientists and the Bayesian approach
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4215140 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6011017 (Why is no real title available?)
• Subjective Probabilities as Basis for Scientific Reasoning?
• Discussion of: ``Specifying prior distributions in reliability applications: towards new formal rules for informative prior elicitation?
• Does it make sense to be an ``objective Bayesian? (Comment on articles by Berger and by Goldstein)
• Science, subjectivity and software (Comment on articles by Berger and by Goldstein)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5001242 (Why is no real title available?)
• Note—Opposition of Interest in Subjective Bayesian Theory
• Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information
• We are all Bayesian, everyone is not a Bayesian
• A defence of subjective fiducial inference

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