The objectivity of subjective Bayesianism

DOI10.1007/s13194-018-0200-1zbMath1428.62027OpenAlexW2734991164MaRDI QIDQ2289709

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 24 January 2020

Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13199/

zbMATH Keywords

statistical inferenceobjectivityBayesianismfrequentismHeather Douglasvalue-free ideal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Related Items (1)

We are all Bayesian, everyone is not a Bayesian

Cites Work

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