The objectivity of subjective Bayesianism

DOI10.1007/S13194-018-0200-1zbMATH Open1428.62027OpenAlexW2734991164MaRDI QIDQ2289709FDOQ2289709

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 24 January 2020

Published in: European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/13199/

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zbMATH Keywords

statistical inferenceBayesianismobjectivityfrequentismHeather Douglasvalue-free ideal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Cites Work

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• Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?
• Confirmation as partial entailment: a representation theorem in inductive logic
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• Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration

Cited In (9)

• Discussion of: ``Specifying prior distributions in reliability applications: towards new formal rules for informative prior elicitation?
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Note—Opposition of Interest in Subjective Bayesian Theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• We are all Bayesian, everyone is not a Bayesian
• Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information
• The subjectivity of scientists and the Bayesian approach
• A defence of subjective fiducial inference

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