In defence of objective Bayesianism
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Publication:3569945
DOI10.1093/ACPROF:OSO/9780199228003.001.0001zbMATH Open1196.00021OpenAlexW596488402MaRDI QIDQ3569945FDOQ3569945
Authors: Jon Williamson 
Publication date: 22 June 2010
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228003.001.0001
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Logic of natural languages (03B65) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
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- Towards a Bayesian theory of second-order uncertainty: lessons from non-standard logics
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- How to resolve doxastic disagreement
- Discussion of ``Objective priors: An introduction for frequentists by M. Ghosh
- Fundamentals of Bayesian epistemology 1. Introducing credences
- Rejoinder: ``Objections to Bayesian statistics
- A triple uniqueness of the maximum entropy approach
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- Why frequentists and Bayesians need each other
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- Blending Bayesian and frequentist methods according to the precision of prior information with applications to hypothesis testing
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- Demystifying dilation
- Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
- From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic
- Bayesian epistemology.
- How uncertain do we need to be?
- GRADATIONAL ACCURACY AND NONCLASSICAL SEMANTICS
- Having a look at the Bayes blind spot
- The modal logic of Bayesian belief revision
- The subjectivity of scientists and the Bayesian approach
- Bayesian chance
- Mechanistic probability
- Determining maximal entropy functions for objective Bayesian inductive logic
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- Invariant equivocation
- Can there be a Bayesian explanationism? On the prospects of a productive partnership
- Logical probability and the strength of mathematical conjectures
- Equivocation axiom on first order languages
- A defence of subjective fiducial inference
- Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics
- Asymptotic conditional probabilities for binary probability functions
- How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss
- How can representationalism accommodate degrees of belief? A dispositional representationalist proposal
- Tracking probabilistic truths: a logic for statistical learning
- Attention to entropic communication
- Logical perspectives on the foundations of probability
- A battle in the statistics wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies
- The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity
- Note—Opposition of Interest in Subjective Bayesian Theory
- Bayesianism from a philosophical perspective and its application to medicine
- Bayesian and frequentist inference derived from the maximum entropy principle with applications to propagating uncertainty about statistical methods
- E.T. Jaynes's solution to the problem of countable additivity
- Calibration for epistemic causality
- Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: new tools for foundation-theoretic epistemology
- Interval estimation, point estimation, and null hypothesis significance testing calibrated by an estimated posterior probability of the null hypothesis
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