scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3846632
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Introductory exposition (textbooks, tutorial papers, etc.) pertaining to statistics (62-01) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to statistics (62-02) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)
This volume, apparently from the plenitude of exercises intended as a text, is aimed at the union of students of statistics interested in induction, and students of philosophy interested in statistics. In fact, its audience is the intersection of these two classes. A good deal of mathematical and statistical maturity is required even to deal successfully with the examples, and more with the arguments. But at the same time the philosophical discussions simply do not provide enough background for the philosophically unsophisticated to understand what is going on. Furthermore, the point of view from which it is written is a rather special one - objective Bayesianism, due in large part to E. T. Jaynes, who has attempted to make Laplacean probability consistent and therefore respectable - and it therefore hardly qualifies as a textbook. Given all this, however, it does provide, for the statistically and philosophically sophisticated reader, an indication of how the neo- Laplacean or objective Bayesian would approach the observations and arguments of those of other persuasions, from Popper to Carnap to Hintikka to Shafer. There are copious and useful references to the literature, but the depth of the analysis leaves something to be desired, particularly in the latter sections dealing with upper and lower probabilities. The most original and interesting sections illustrate how objective- Bayesian probability takes account of both the simplicity of a hypothesis and its confirmity to the evidence. This depends heavily, of course, on the objective-Bayesian priors, and will carry little weight with those who find such prior probabilities inconsistent or suspect.
- A history of inverse probability. From Thomas Bayes to Karl Pearson.
- A note on inductive probability
- A natural prior probability distribution derived from the propositional calculus
- Scoring in context
- Carnap and the logic of inductive inference
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1269584 (Why is no real title available?)
- A logical introduction to probability and induction
- The Inductive Applications of Probability Calculus
- Inductive Influence
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274713 (Why is no real title available?)
- Probabilistic inductive inference: A survey
- Scoring, truthlikeness, and value
- Aggregating agents with opinions about different propositions
- Probability by convention
- Vagueness, uncertainty and degrees of belief: two kinds of indeterminacy -- one kind of credence
- Objective Bayesianism with predicate languages
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