scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1269584

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) General considerations in statistical decision theory (62C05) Decision theory (91B06)

Review text

The author presents an overview of the development of the Bayesian approach. He concludes his discussion by ``Bayesian confirmation theory has become the theory of choice among most philosophers of inductive inference, if not yet among statisticians. [\dots]. The programme is not, as these pages also show, without its problems, some of them serious conceptual problems. But not are rival approaches without theirs, which Bayesians argue at least as daunting. The problems discussed include the following. -- Dutch books and consistency constraints as arguments for probability axioms (Ramsey, de Finetti); -- axiomatic approaches to utility (Ramsey, Savage); -- Objective prior distributions (Jeffrey, James, David); -- Stable estimation (Jeffrey, Lindley); -- Dynamic Dutch books as argument for Bayesian conditionalism; -- Jeffrey conditionalism; Objective probability (de Finetti, Lewis, Skyrms). For the entire collection see [Zbl 0908.90001].

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