Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
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Publication:542115
DOI10.1007/s11229-009-9515-yzbMath1233.03021OpenAlexW2114603490MaRDI QIDQ542115
Publication date: 8 June 2011
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9515-y
maximum entropyformal epistemologyconditionalisationmaxentobjective BayesianismBayesian epistemology
Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Logic in the philosophy of science (03A10)
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