Why frequentists and Bayesians need each other

DOI10.1007/S10670-011-9317-8MaRDI QIDQ486953zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jon Williamson

Publication date 19 January 2015

Published in Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-011-9317-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian inference (62F15) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

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• A formal theory of inductive inference. Part I
• Game theory, maximum entropy, minimum discrepancy and robust Bayesian decision theory
• In defence of objective Bayesianism
• Interval estimation for a binomial proportion. (With comments and a rejoinder).
• Objective Bayesianism, Bayesian conditionalisation and voluntarism
• Probabilistic logics and probabilistic networks
• The problem of inductive inference
• Uncertain Inference

Cited in

(12)

• Why Isn't Everyone a Bayesian?
• A battle in the statistics wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies
• Confidence distributions and empirical Bayes posterior distributions unified as distributions of evidential support
• Error and inference: an outsider stand on a frequentist philosophy
• Controlling the degree of caution in statistical inference with the Bayesian and frequentist approaches as opposite extremes
• Making decisions with evidential probability and objective Bayesian calibration inductive logics
• The interplay of Bayesian and frequentist analysis
• From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic
• Equivocation for the objective Bayesian
• How uncertain do we need to be?
• A polemic for Bayesian statistics
• A 250-year argument: belief, behavior, and the bootstrap

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