Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction
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Publication:5492047
DOI10.1093/bjps/axl003zbMath1098.03030OpenAlexW2141673338WikidataQ56067040 ScholiaQ56067040MaRDI QIDQ5492047
Publication date: 12 October 2006
Published in: The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axl003
Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48)
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