What type of Type I error? Contrasting the Neyman-Pearson and Fisherian approaches in the context of exact and direct replications
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Publication:2695385
DOI10.1007/s11229-019-02433-0OpenAlexW2980553079WikidataQ127018355 ScholiaQ127018355MaRDI QIDQ2695385
Publication date: 31 March 2023
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02433-0
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