Preferences Over Sets of Lotteries1
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Publication:5429102
DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00431.xzbMath1297.91051OpenAlexW2023030607MaRDI QIDQ5429102
Publication date: 29 November 2007
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00431.x
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