Rationality of belief or: why Savage's axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality
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Publication:383009
DOI10.1007/s11229-011-0034-2zbMath1275.91022OpenAlexW2120264500MaRDI QIDQ383009
Itzhak Gilboa, David Schmeidler, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 25 November 2013
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0034-2
Related Items (19)
Purely subjective variational preferences ⋮ Rational beliefs in rationalizability ⋮ The pricing effects of ambiguous private information ⋮ Optimal Learning Under Robustness and Time-Consistency ⋮ History as a coordination device ⋮ A representation theorem for frequently irrational agents ⋮ The ecological rationality of decision criteria ⋮ What are axiomatizations good for? ⋮ Preference for knowledge ⋮ Prior symmetry, similarity-based reasoning, and endogenous categorization ⋮ Ambiguity and the Bayesian Paradigm ⋮ Are beliefs a matter of taste? A case for objective imprecise information ⋮ Aggregation of multiple prior opinions ⋮ Opinion dynamics and learning in social networks ⋮ Updating confidence in beliefs ⋮ Aggregation of opinions in networks of individuals and collectives ⋮ Stable behavior and generalized partition ⋮ Ambiguity through confidence functions ⋮ Towards a Bayesian Theory of Second-Order Uncertainty: Lessons from Non-Standard Logics
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