The Ellsberg paradox: a challenge to quantum decision theory?
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Publication:2409687
DOI10.1016/j.jmp.2016.08.003zbMath1382.91023OpenAlexW2463515353MaRDI QIDQ2409687
Publication date: 13 October 2017
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Psychology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp16-08.pdf
probability weightingquantum probabilityEllsberg paradoxmatching probabilitiesprojective expected utilityprojective prospect theory
Related Items (2)
Representing attitudes towards ambiguity in Hilbert space: foundations and applications ⋮ The triple-store experiment: a first simultaneous test of classical and quantum probabilities in choice over menus
Cites Work
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