The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
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(13)- A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling
- Is there a role for amplifiers in sexual selection?
- Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
- Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability
- Threat displays are not handicaps
- Error-proneness as a handicap signal
- An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty
- Telling the other what one knows? Strategic lying in a modified acquiring-a-company experiment with two-sided private information
- On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
- Simple signaling games of sexual selection (Grafen's revisited)
- Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
- Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
- Evolutionary dynamics of the handicap principle: an example
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