A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2009.11.019zbMATH Open1406.92420OpenAlexW2006075404WikidataQ51599509 ScholiaQ51599509MaRDI QIDQ1715314FDOQ1715314

Authors: C. Y. Cyrus Chu 

Publication date: 4 February 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.11.019

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zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilityhandicap theoryindividual rationalitysex selectionsignaling equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Genetics and epigenetics (92D10) Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The co-evolution of intergenerational transfers and longevity: an optimal life history approach
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle

Cited In (3)

• Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
• Duration of courtship effort as a costly signal
• On the evolution of intergenerational division of labor, menopause and transfers among adults and offspring

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