Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
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Cites work
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- Diffusion models in population genetics
- Game theory and evolution: Finite size and absolute fitness measures
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(8)- Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability
- Sexual dimorphism and sexual selection: a unified economic analysis
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- An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty
- Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling
- Is there a role for amplifiers in sexual selection?
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