Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2007.09.002zbMATH Open1202.92062OpenAlexW2047640495WikidataQ81572793 ScholiaQ81572793MaRDI QIDQ615385FDOQ615385
Authors: Kjell Hausken, Jack Hirshleifer 
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp842.pdf
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kin selectiongeneral equilibriumsignallingheredityhandicap principleMalthusian equi-marginal principlemating competition
Cites Work
- Contest success functions
- Diffusion models in population genetics
- The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
- Game theory and evolution: Finite size and absolute fitness measures
- A long-term genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference: the theories of Fisher and Zahavi re-examined
Cited In (8)
- The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
- Simple signaling games of sexual selection (Grafen's revisited)
- An evolutionary advantage for extravagant honesty
- Sexual dimorphism and sexual selection: a unified economic analysis
- Incentives in the family II: behavioral dynamics and the evolution of non-costly signaling
- Is there a role for amplifiers in sexual selection?
- Strategic choice handicaps when females seek high male net viability
- A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling
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