Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2007.09.002zbMATH Open1202.92062OpenAlexW2047640495WikidataQ81572793 ScholiaQ81572793MaRDI QIDQ615385FDOQ615385

Authors: Kjell Hausken, Jack Hirshleifer 

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp842.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

kin selectiongeneral equilibriumsignallingheredityhandicap principleMalthusian equi-marginal principlemating competition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15)

Cites Work

• Contest success functions
• Diffusion models in population genetics
• The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
• Game theory and evolution: Finite size and absolute fitness measures
• A long-term genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference: the theories of Fisher and Zahavi re-examined

Cited In (2)

• Sexual dimorphism and sexual selection: a unified economic analysis
• A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling

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