On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals

DOI10.1016/J.JTBI.2013.01.017zbMath1314.92176OpenAlexW2156152528WikidataQ45358521 ScholiaQ45358521MaRDI QIDQ2349715

Graeme D. Ruxton, Mark Broom

Publication date: 17 June 2015

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/2501/1/pooled.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

communicationsignallinghandicapbeggingstrategic costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Strategic Information Transmission

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