Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00337-9MaRDI QIDQ831075zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Joshua Safley, Shan Sun, J. Rychtář

Publication date 10 May 2021

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00337-9

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhandicap principledishonest signallingindex hypothesispygmalion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Evolutionary stability conditions for signaling games with costly signals
• When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
• Some dynamics of signaling games

Cites work

• Evolutionarily stable defence and signalling of that defence
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
• Perceptual advertisement by the prey of stalking or ambushing predators
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel

Cited in

(7)

• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
• Deception in sender-receiver games
• When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
• Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4174720 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q831075)