Dishonest signalling in a variant of pygmalion game

DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00337-9zbMATH Open1461.91063OpenAlexW2983341057WikidataQ126807509 ScholiaQ126807509MaRDI QIDQ831075FDOQ831075

Authors: Joshua Safley, Shan Sun, J. Rychtář 

Publication date: 10 May 2021

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00337-9

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhandicap principledishonest signallingindex hypothesispygmalion game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• Perceptual advertisement by the prey of stalking or ambushing predators
• Evolutionarily stable defence and signalling of that defence
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals

Cited In (7)

• Honest signaling in zero-sum games is hard, and lying is even harder
• Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling
• On the evolutionary stability of zero-cost pooled-equilibrium signals
• Strategic inattention in the Sir Philip Sidney Game
• Deception in sender-receiver games
• When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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