When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2009.02.002zbMATH Open1211.92067OpenAlexW1982968780WikidataQ43465200 ScholiaQ43465200MaRDI QIDQ615596FDOQ615596

Authors: Steven Hamblin, Peter L. Hurd 

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2009.02.002

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zbMATH Keywords

game theorygenetic algorithmssignalinganimal communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59) Animal behavior (92D50) Evolutionary games (91A22) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Cites Work

• Non-cooperative games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Game theory
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Evolutionary dynamics. Exploring the equations of life.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
• The application of genetic algorithms in behavioural ecology, illustrated with a model of anti-predator vigilance

Cited In (1)

• Honesty through repeated interactions

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