When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?
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Publication:615596
DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2009.02.002zbMath1211.92067WikidataQ43465200 ScholiaQ43465200MaRDI QIDQ615596
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2009.02.002
90C59: Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming
91A40: Other game-theoretic models
91A22: Evolutionary games
92D50: Animal behavior
Related Items
Cites Work
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- Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
- On evolutionarily stable sets
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