On evolutionarily stable sets
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Publication:1074522
DOI10.1007/BF00276549zbMath0589.92011OpenAlexW4376522474WikidataQ56047460 ScholiaQ56047460MaRDI QIDQ1074522
Publication date: 1985
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00276549
dynamical systemsequilibriumpopulation geneticsESSstrategiesevolutionary stable strategiesevolutionary game modelsevolutionary stable setsmixed-strategist modelssexual populations
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Genetics and epigenetics (92D10)
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