Stable and historic behavior in replicator equations generated by similar-order preserving mappings
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Publication:6044481
DOI10.1007/S00032-022-00376-9zbMATH Open1518.37040arXiv2208.01120OpenAlexW4313400823MaRDI QIDQ6044481FDOQ6044481
Authors: Mansoor Saburov 
Publication date: 19 May 2023
Published in: Milan Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: One could observe drastically different dynamics of zero-sum and non-zero-sum games under replicator equations. In zero-sum games, heteroclinic cycles naturally occur whenever the species of the population supersede each other in a cyclic fashion (like for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game). In this case, the highly erratic oscillations may cause the divergence of the time averages. In contrast, it is a common belief that the most ``reasonable" replicator equations of non-zero-sum games satisfy ``The Folk Theorem of Evolutionary Game Theory" which asserts that (i) a Nash equilibrium is a rest point; (ii) a stable rest point is a Nash equilibrium; (iii) a strictly Nash equilibrium is asymptotically stable; (iv) any interior convergent orbit evolves to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we propose two distinct vast classes of replicator equations generated by similar-order preserving mappings which exhibit stable as well as mean historic behavior. In the latter case, the time averages of the orbit will slowly oscillate during the evolution of the system and do not converge to any limit. This will eventually cause the divergence of higher-order repeated time averages.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2208.01120
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Ergodic theorems, spectral theory, Markov operators (37A30) Stability theory for smooth dynamical systems (37C75) Evolutionary games (91A22) General equilibrium theory (91B50)
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