On evolutionarily stable sets
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The concept of evolutionary stable strategies (ES strategies) plays a role in the discussion of certain dynamical systems (which are e.g. used for modelling evolutionary processes with frequency dependent selection). This concept is generalized by introducing so-called evolutionary stable sets (ES sets). It is shown that ES-sets are attracting for a large class of dynamical systems, i.e. after perturbation from an equilibrium the system will tend towards another equilibrium in the set. Some examples (from population biology) are given in order to demonstrate the usefulness of the ES- theory.
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