Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces

DOI10.1142/S0219198923500123MaRDI QIDQ6545008zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju

Publication date 28 May 2024

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable setsasymmetric evolutionary gamesgames with continuous strategy spacesstrict equilibrium setrobustness against indirect invasions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 835835 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1442674 (Why is no real title available?)
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• CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces
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• Cross entropy minimization in uninvadable states of complex populations
• Evolutionarily Robust Strategies: Two Nontrivial Examples and a Theorem
• Evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
• Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
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• Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
• On evolutionarily stable sets
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