Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games
DOI10.1016/J.JDE.2015.07.005zbMATH Open1360.91027OpenAlexW2200039814MaRDI QIDQ496723FDOQ496723
Authors: Saul Mendoza-Palacios, Onésimo Hernández-Lerma 
Publication date: 22 September 2015
Published in: Journal of Differential Equations (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jde.2015.07.005
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evolutionary gamesreplicator dynamicspopulation gamesasymmetric evolutionary gamesordinary differential equations in measure spacesspace of finite signed measures
Noncooperative games (91A10) Nonlinear ordinary differential equations and systems (34A34) Nonlinear differential equations in abstract spaces (34G20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cited In (23)
- Dynamics of asymmetric division of labor game with environmental feedback
- Evolutionary game theory in mixed strategies: from microscopic interactions to kinetic equations
- Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
- Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Symmetry and Collective Fluctuations in Evolutionary Games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary game theory on measure spaces: well-posedness
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Natural selection between two games with environmental feedback
- A survey of static and dynamic potential games
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Beyond the symmetric normal form: extensive form games, asymmetric games and games with continuous strategy spaces
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Perturbed Bayesian best response dynamic in continuum games
- Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
- Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces
- Evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games
- The replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces: finite approximations
- Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
- Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition
- Asymmetric evolutionary games with environmental feedback
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