Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
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Publication:2292120
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5869530 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 835835 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Evolutionarily stable sets
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- Evolutionary and dynamic stability in continuous population games
- Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
- Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games
- Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
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- Measure dynamics on a one-dimensional continuous trait space: theoretical foundations for adaptive dynamics
- On evolutionarily stable sets
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Cited in
(9)- Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games
- Asymmetric games in monomorphic and polymorphic populations
- Protected polymorphisms and evolutionary stability of patch-selection strategies in stochastic environments
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
- Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
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