Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
DOI10.1007/S13235-019-00302-6zbMATH Open1431.91034OpenAlexW2913763859MaRDI QIDQ2292120FDOQ2292120
Authors: Aradhana Narang, A. J. Shaiju 
Publication date: 3 February 2020
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-019-00302-6
Recommendations
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
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- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
replicator dynamicsasymmetric evolutionary gamesgames with continuous strategy spaceLyapunov and asymptotic stabilityuninvadable profiles and sets
Asymptotic properties of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D05) Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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Cited In (9)
- Globally Strong Uninvadable Sets of Profiles in Asymmetric Games
- Asymmetric games in monomorphic and polymorphic populations
- Protected polymorphisms and evolutionary stability of patch-selection strategies in stochastic environments
- Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games
- Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets
- Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games
- Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
- Evolutionary stability of polymorphic population states in continuous games
- Robustness against indirect invasions in asymmetric games with continuous strategy spaces
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