Potential games with continuous player sets

DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2696zbMath0990.91005OpenAlexW2115483886MaRDI QIDQ5937317

Publication date: 19 August 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.2000.2696

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibria congestion games Kuhn-Tucker condition random matching games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution, Continuous time learning algorithms in optimization and game theory, On replicator equations with nonlinear payoff functions defined by the Ricker models, A survey of static and dynamic potential games, Generalized perturbed best response dynamics with a continuum of strategies, Replicator dynamics: old and new, Riemannian game dynamics, Simple formulas for stationary distributions and stochastically stable states, Advances in dynamic traffic assignment: TAC. A new relationship between Wardrop's user equilibrium and Nash equilibrium, Nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many types, On Best-Response Dynamics in Potential Games, Selection-mutation dynamics with asymmetrical reproduction kernels, Computing equilibria: a computational complexity perspective, Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space, Nonatomic potential games: the continuous strategy case, Inertial Game Dynamics and Applications to Constrained Optimization, Evolution in games with randomly disturbed payoffs, Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation, An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets, On Minty-variational inequalities and evolutionary stable states of generalized monotone games, Equilibrium refinement for a model of non-monocentric internal structures of cities: a potential game approach, Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities, Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks, Decompositions and potentials for normal form games, Dynamic coordination among heterogeneous agents, Evolutionary implementation in a public goods game, Excess payoff dynamics in games, The Value of Information in Selfish Routing, Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation, Pairwise comparison dynamics for games with continuous strategy space, Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics, A note on social learning in non-atomic routing games, Global manipulation by local obfuscation, No-regret algorithms in on-line learning, games and convex optimization, Infection and immunization: a new class of evolutionary game dynamics, Algorithms for generalized potential games with mixed-integer variables, Evolution of theories of mind, Independent random matching, Nonlinear relative-proportion-based route adjustment process for day-to-day traffic dynamics: modeling, equilibrium and stability analysis, Load Balancing Congestion Games and Their Asymptotic Behavior, Reinforcement learning in population games, Large population aggregative potential games, Congestion games with failures, Stochastic imitative game dynamics with committed agents, Information sharing for a coordination game in fluctuating environments, Ordinal potentials in smooth games, Probabilistic interpretations of integrability for game dynamics, Evolutionary imitative dynamics with population-varying aspiration levels, Evolution in Bayesian games. II: Stability of purified equilibria, Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics, The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing, Nonconvergence to saddle boundary points under perturbed reinforcement learning, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary dynamics on measurable strategy spaces: asymmetric games, An evolutionary analysis of growth and fluctuations with negative externalities, Tempered best response dynamics, Irrational behavior in the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics, Schelling paradox in a system of cities, Evolutionary potential games on lattices, Discrete-space agglomeration model with social interactions: multiplicity, stability, and continuous limit of equilibria, Computation of Cournot-Nash equilibria by entropic regularization, Growth, agglomeration, and urban congestion, Distributed optimization with information-constrained population dynamics, Stability in games with continua of equilibria, An improved algorithm for detecting potential games, Tradable credit scheme for control of evolutionary traffic flows to system optimum: model and its convergence, On the observational equivalence of random matching, Stable games and their dynamics, Large population potential games, History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered, Evolutionary implementation in aggregative games, Atomic congestion games: fast, myopic and concurrent, An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics, A payoff-based learning procedure and its application to traffic games, Evolutionary game dynamics, Securing infrastructure facilities: when does proactive defense help?, Atomic Congestion Games: Fast, Myopic and Concurrent, The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games, The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic, A trial-and-error congestion pricing method for day-to-day dynamic network flows considering travelers' heterogeneous inertia patterns, The noncooperative fixed charge transportation problem, Sample Path Large Deviations for Stochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics, The rise and fall of catastrophe theory applications in economics: was the baby thrown out with the bathwater?, Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approach, Estimating heterogeneous agent preferences by inverse optimization in a randomized nonatomic game, Social learning in nonatomic routing games, Value of Information in Bayesian Routing Games, Two-terminal routing games with unknown active players, A survey on networking games in telecommunications, DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES, The Downs-Thomson paradox: existence, uniqueness and stability of user equilibria, Online Learning of Nash Equilibria in Congestion Games, Elimination of non-individualistic preferences in large population aggregative games, Excess payoff dynamics and other well-behaved evolutionary dynamics, Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies, Pairwise comparison dynamics and evolutionary foundations for Nash equilibrium, Tributes to Bill Sandholm, Learning in nonatomic games. I: Finite action spaces and population games, Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games, The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets, A Mean-Risk Model for the Traffic Assignment Problem with Stochastic Travel Times, Finite composite games: equilibria and dynamics

Cites Work