DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES

DOI10.1142/S0219198906000989zbMath1197.91047OpenAlexW2136663431MaRDI QIDQ3421632

Marc Meertens, Hans Reijnierse, Jos A. M. Potters

Publication date: 7 February 2007

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000989

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitylimit setdynamic selection process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Stability of solutions to ordinary differential equations (34D20) Dynamical systems in optimization and economics (37N40) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Axiomatic Definition of the Value of a Matrix Game
• Evolutionary Selection in Normal-Form Games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
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