Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player

Cited in

(65)

The target projection dynamic
ESSs with two types of players II. (Intra- and interspecific competition between haploid species)
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Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory
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Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players
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On delayed discrete evolutionary dynamics
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On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
Evolutionary games in interacting communities
Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement
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Asymmetric population games and the legacy of Maynard Smith: From evolution to game theory and back?
Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
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On Minty-variational inequalities and evolutionary stable states of generalized monotone games
Review: Game theory of public goods in one-shot social dilemmas without assortment
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ESS, NIS and GIS for matrix games in n-species systems
Inertial game dynamics and applications to constrained optimization
DYNAMIC SELECTION IN NORMAL-FORM GAMES
LEARNING, EVOLUTION AND POPULATION DYNAMICS
DOES NOISE UNDERMINE THE FIRST-MOVER ADVANTAGE? AN EVOLUTIONARY ANALYSIS OF BAGWELL'S EXAMPLE
Chaos in learning a simple two-person game
EQUILIBRIUM, EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY AND GRADIENT DYNAMICS
Instability of belief-free equilibria
The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
Evolutionary game theory: a generalization of the ESS definition
Asymptotics for the time of ruin in the war of attrition
Introspection dynamics in asymmetric multiplayer games
Evolution of preferences in multiple populations
The ideal free distribution: a review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective
On replicator equations with nonlinear payoff functions defined by the Ricker models
Asymmetric replicator dynamics on Polish spaces: invariance, stability, and convergence
The payoff matrix of repeated asymmetric 2 2 games
Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary games: generalizing evolutionarily stable strategy
Trust AI regulation? Discerning users are vital to build trust and effective AI regulation
Solid outcomes in finite games
Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives
Time-dependent animal conflicts. I: The symmetric case
Time-dependent animal conflicts. II: The asymmetric case
Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games
Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models
On the dynamics of asymmetric games
Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system

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