Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
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Publication:2632762
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.02.003zbMath1412.91009arXiv1307.4141OpenAlexW2057910889WikidataQ51111471 ScholiaQ51111471MaRDI QIDQ2632762
Publication date: 15 May 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4141
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