Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.02.003zbMath1412.91009arXiv1307.4141OpenAlexW2057910889WikidataQ51111471 ScholiaQ51111471MaRDI QIDQ2632762

Naoki Masuda

Publication date: 15 May 2019

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1307.4141

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicscooperationevolutionary gamehomophily

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (1)

General non-linear imitation leads to limit cycles in eco-evolutionary dynamics

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