Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players

DOI10.1007/BF00168009MaRDI QIDQ1179451zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors A. T. Dash, Ross Cressman

Publication date 26 June 1992

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00168009

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionarily stable strategiesstrong stabilitydynamic stabilitytwo types of playersfrequency evolutionfrequency-dependent evolutionstatic ESS conditionstwo-species haploid system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Animal behavior (92D50)

Recommendations

• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary stability of pure-strategy equilibria in finite games
• Evolutionary stable strategies and game dynamics for n-person games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1786168
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
• Determining evolutionarily stable strategies in dynamic games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and replicator dynamics in asymmetric two-population games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 528839
• Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
• Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 43585 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
• Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics
• Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. III. Games between two populations with selfinteraction

Cited in

(6)

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 53924 (Why is no real title available?)
• Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player I. Two-species haploid or randomly mating diploid
• Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
• Evolutionary game theory with two groups of individuals
• ESSs with two types of players II. (Intra- and interspecific competition between haploid species)
• Uninvadability in \(N\)-species frequency models for resident\,-\,mutant systems with discrete or continuous time

This page was built for publication: Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1179451)