Strong stability and evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of players
DOI10.1007/BF00168009zbMATH Open0742.92014OpenAlexW2031023345MaRDI QIDQ1179451FDOQ1179451
Authors: A. T. Dash, Ross Cressman 
Publication date: 26 June 1992
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00168009
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evolutionarily stable strategiesstrong stabilitydynamic stabilitytwo types of playersfrequency evolutionfrequency-dependent evolutionstatic ESS conditionstwo-species haploid system
Cites Work
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- Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
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- Selfregulation of behaviour in animal societies. III. Games between two populations with selfinteraction
- Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics
- Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player
Cited In (6)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionarily stable strategies with two types of player I. Two-species haploid or randomly mating diploid
- Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
- Evolutionary game theory with two groups of individuals
- ESSs with two types of players II. (Intra- and interspecific competition between haploid species)
- Uninvadability in \(N\)-species frequency models for resident\,-\,mutant systems with discrete or continuous time
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