Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2013.04.005zbMath1284.91064MaRDI QIDQ2441216

Antonella Ianni

Publication date: 24 March 2014

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/7155

zbMATH Keywords

learning; replicator dynamics; law of effect; strict Nash equilibrium; power law of practice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Decentralized pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium, A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning

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