Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5475021
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00372zbMath1142.91357OpenAlexW4214854436MaRDI QIDQ5475021
Publication date: 16 June 2006
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00372
Related Items
On the robustness of learning in games with stochastically perturbed payoff observations, Decentralized pricing and the equivalence between Nash and Walrasian equilibrium, Riemannian game dynamics, Penalty-Regulated Dynamics and Robust Learning Procedures in Games, Stochastic approximation to understand simple simulation models, Equilibrium selection with coupled populations in hawk-dove games: theory and experiment in continuous time, A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules, A note on adjusted replicator dynamics in iterated games, Learning in perturbed asymmetric games, Stochastic evolution of rules for playing finite normal form games, Learning and equilibrium as useful approximations: accuracy of prediction on randomly selected constant sum games, Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Interaction dynamics of two reinforcement learners, Wisdom of crowds versus groupthink: learning in groups and in isolation, Perturbed best response dynamics in a hawk-dove game, An adaptive learning model with foregone payoff information, Learning by similarity-weighted imitation in winner-takes-all games, Learning in experimental \(2\times 2\) games, Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives, Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information, A gradient-based reinforcement learning model of market equilibration, Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play, Learning in games with risky payoffs, Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces, Where do mistakes lead? A survey of games with incompetent players, Paying attention to payoffs in analogy-based learning, Probe and adjust in information transfer games, Popularity of reinforcement-based and belief-based learning models: an evolutionary approach, David Lewis in the lab: experimental results on the emergence of meaning, Quantal response equilibria with heterogeneous agents, Learning strict Nash equilibria through reinforcement, A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games, On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules, Evolutionary games under incompetence, Transient and asymptotic dynamics of reinforcement learning in games, Emergence of information transfer by inductive learning, Market efficiency and learning in an endogenously unstable environment, Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games, Trembling hand perfection for mixed quantal/best response equilibria, Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games, A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence, Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence, Analyzing behavior implied by EWA learning: an emphasis on distinguishing reinforcement from belief learning, Learning in games with unstable equilibria, Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies, On the convergence of reinforcement learning, Evolutionary game dynamics, The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games, Games with coupled populations: an experiment in continuous time, Convergence results on stochastic adaptive learning, Learning across games, Learning in Games via Reinforcement and Regularization, The target projection dynamic, Towards a taxonomy of learning dynamics in \(2\times 2\) games, Learning and sophistication in coordination games, Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning, Generality, repetition, and the role of descriptive learning models, A choice prediction competition for market entry games: an introduction, Entropic penalties in finite games, On the role of the group composition for achieving optimality
