A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.06.008zbMATH Open1181.91029OpenAlexW2043419063MaRDI QIDQ844667FDOQ844667

Jens Josephson

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0474.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Monte Carlo simulationevolutionary stabilityfictitious playreinforcement learninglearning in gamesEWA learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Monte Carlo methods (65C05) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Fictitious play in \(2\times n\) games
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
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• Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
• On the Global Convergence of Stochastic Fictitious Play
• On the convergence of reinforcement learning
• Attainability of boundary points under reinforcement learning
• An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning
• Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
• An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.
• Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias
• Learning, matching, and aggregation

Cited In (9)

• Evolution of theories of mind
• The roles of particle swarm intelligence in the prisoner's dilemma based on continuous and mixed strategy systems on scale-free networks
• Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game
• Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games
• An evolutionary approach to learning in a changing environment.
• Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior
• On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules
• Learning games
• Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

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