A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules

DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.008zbMath1181.91029MaRDI QIDQ844667

Jens Josephson

Publication date: 19 January 2010

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0474.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stability; Monte Carlo simulation; reinforcement learning; fictitious play; learning in games; EWA learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

65C05: Monte Carlo methods

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

Related Items

Evolution of theories of mind, Altruistic versus egoistic behavior in a public good game, Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games, Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior, Learning games, Stochastic adaptation in finite games played by heterogeneous populations

Cites Work

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