A numerical analysis of the evolutionary stability of learning rules
From MaRDI portal
Publication:844667
DOI10.1016/j.jedc.2007.06.008zbMath1181.91029OpenAlexW2043419063MaRDI QIDQ844667
Publication date: 19 January 2010
Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://swopec.hhs.se/hastef/papers/hastef0474.pdf
evolutionary stabilityMonte Carlo simulationreinforcement learningfictitious playlearning in gamesEWA learning
Monte Carlo methods (65C05) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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