On learning dynamics underlying the evolution of learning rules

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2013.09.003zbMATH Open1303.92079OpenAlexW2067312754WikidataQ46877684 ScholiaQ46877684MaRDI QIDQ487335FDOQ487335

Laurent Lehmann, Slimane Dridi

Publication date: 20 January 2015

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://serval.unil.ch/resource/serval:BIB_E6628D11E4D8.P001/REF.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

stochastic approximationevolutionary game theoryfictitious playreinforcement learningfluctuating environmentsproducer-scrounger game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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Cited In (3)

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• Foundations of Rule Learning
• Hamilton's rule, the evolution of behavior rules and the wizardry of control theory

Uses Software

• Mathematica
• R

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