Adaptive learning in large populations

DOI10.1007/S00285-019-01427-3zbMATH Open1427.35289arXiv1901.02908OpenAlexW2972879814WikidataQ90111390 ScholiaQ90111390MaRDI QIDQ2007697FDOQ2007697

Mikhail Perepelitsa

Publication date: 22 November 2019

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider the adaptive learning rule of Harley (1981) for behavior selection in symmetric conflict games in large populations. The rule uses organisms' past, accumulated rewards as the predictor for the future behavior, and can be traced in many life forms from bacteria to humans. We derive a partial differential equation (PDE) that describes the stochastic learning in a population of agents. The equation has simple structure of the `conservation of mass'-type equation in the space of stimuli to engage in a particular type of behavior. We analyze the solutions of the PDE model for typical 2x2 games. It is found that in games with small residual stimuli, adaptive learning rules with faster memory decay have an evolutionary advantage.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1901.02908

zbMATH Keywords

symmetric gamesadaptive learningrelative payoff sum

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

PDEs in connection with game theory, economics, social and behavioral sciences (35Q91) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Cited In (2)

• A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
• Effective learning in the presence of adaptive counterparts

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