Learning through reinforcement and replicator dynamics
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Publication:1381975
DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2319zbMATH Open0892.90198OpenAlexW1995622844WikidataQ57918121 ScholiaQ57918121MaRDI QIDQ1381975FDOQ1381975
Publication date: 1 April 1998
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/66618e819c5fa4d5ee7ea81f8563eb57ade36c39
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Problems related to evolution (92D15) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)
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- A model of cultural evolution in the context of strategic conflict
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- Adaptive learning in large populations
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- Learning to play games in extensive form by valuation
- Dynamics of Bayesian updating with dependent data and misspecified models
- Reinforcement learning in population games
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- A GENERALIZED MODEL OF BEST RESPONSE ADAPTATION
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