Learning equilibria of a stochastic game on Gaussian interference channels with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-51034-7_15zbMATH Open1417.94006arXiv1503.02839OpenAlexW2963032984MaRDI QIDQ4607282FDOQ4607282

Utpal Mukherji, Vinod Sharma, A. Krishna Chaitanya

Publication date: 13 March 2018

Published in: Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We consider a wireless communication system in which $N$ transmitter-receiver pairs want to communicate with each other. Each transmitter transmits data at a certain rate using a power that depends on the channel gain to its receiver. If a receiver can successfully receive the message, it sends an acknowledgment (ACK), else it sends a negative ACK (NACK). Each user aims to maximize its probability of successful transmission. We formulate this problem as a stochastic game and propose a fully distributed learning algorithm to find a correlated equilibrium (CE). In addition, we use a no regret algorithm to find a coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) for our power allocation game. We also propose a fully distributed learning algorithm to find a Pareto optimal solution. In general Pareto points do not guarantee fairness among the users, therefore we also propose an algorithm to compute a Nash bargaining solution which is Pareto optimal and provides fairness among users. Finally, under the same game theoretic setup, we study these equilibria and Pareto points when each transmitter sends data at multiple rates rather than at a fixed rate. We compare the sum rate obtained at the CE, CCE, Nash bargaining solution and the Pareto point and also via some other well known recent algorithms.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1503.02839

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zbMATH Keywords

learningcorrelated equilibriumincomplete information gamefading interference channelpower allocation gameregret matching.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication theory (94A05) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Cites Work

• Prediction, Learning, and Games
• Learning mixed equilibria
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• Adaptive Heuristics
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• Learning by trial and error
• Learning efficient Nash equilibria in distributed systems
• Asynchronous Iterative Water-Filling for Gaussian Frequency-Selective Interference Channels
• Learning Equilibria of a Stochastic Game on Gaussian Interference Channels with Incomplete Information

Cited In (1)

• Learning Equilibria of a Stochastic Game on Gaussian Interference Channels with Incomplete Information

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