The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games

DOI10.1098/RSPA.2019.0355MaRDI QIDQ5160801zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Johann Bauer, M. Broom, Eduardo Alonso

Publication date 29 October 2021

Published in Proceedings of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1905.07839, https://zenodo.org/record/3662216

zbMATH Keywords

mutationevolutionary gamesmathematical modellingreplicator dynamicsapplied mathematicsmultiple populations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: The multi-population replicator dynamics (RD) can be considered a dynamic approach to the study of multi-player games, where it was shown to be related to Cross' learning, as well as of systems of coevolving populations. However, not all of its equilibria are Nash equilibria (NE) of the underlying game, and neither convergence to an NE nor convergence in general are guaranteed. Although interior equilibria are guaranteed to be NE, no interior equilibrium can be asymptotically stable in the multi-population RD, resulting, e.g., in cyclic orbits around a single interior NE. We introduce a new notion of equilibria of RD, called mutation limits, which is based on the inclusion of a naturally arising, simple form of mutation, but is invariant under the specific choice of mutation parameters. We prove the existence of such mutation limits for a large range of games, and consider a subclass of particular interest, that of attracting mutation limits. Attracting mutation limits are approximated by asymptotically stable equilibria of the (mutation-)perturbed RD, and hence, offer an approximate dynamic solution of the underlying game, especially if the original dynamic has no asymptotically stable equilibria. In this sense, mutation stabilises the system in certain cases and makes attracting mutation limits near-attainable. Furthermore, the relevance of attracting mutation limits as a game theoretic equilibrium concept is emphasised by a similarity of (mutation-)perturbed RD to the Q-learning algorithm in the context of multi-agent reinforcement learning. In contrast to the guaranteed existence of mutation limits, attracting mutation limits do not exist in all games, raising the question of their characterization.

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Cited in

(2)

• Modelling evolution in structured populations involving multiplayer interactions
• A stochastic variant of replicator dynamics in zero-sum games and its invariant measures

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